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Liberalism, as a normative ideal, takes persons to be free and equal. Moral 
cosmopolitanism, also as a normative ideal, takes all persons, independent of 
citizenship, to be the ultimate units of moral concern. Once we bring these two ideals 
together, and apply them to the world in which we live, the fact that individuals 
cannot generally cross international borders and settle in the country of their choice 
becomes particularly troublesome. After all, a commitment to freedom for all sits 
uneasily with our practice of closed borders, while a commitment to equality for all 
sits uneasily with the fact that socio-economic opportunities are unevenly distributed 
around the globe. 
 Such tension between widely held moral commitments and the world as we 
find it, has led many scholars to question the moral right of the state to exclude 
immigrants as it sees fit (Carens, 1987; Cole, 2000; Oberman, 2013). Their main 
strategy has been to stress the value of personal autonomy and the importance of 
being able to migrate in order to meet one’s basic needs or pursue projects and 
relationships that can be best or only pursued outside one’s country of citizenship. 
The legal-institutional outcome of this view is that international borders should be 
fairly open, with restrictions on entry only justified if the arrival of immigrants would 
lead to social chaos and the breakdown of public order. 
 Not everyone agrees. Partly as a response to calls for open borders, a number 
of scholars have also defended the state’s right to control its borders. This position has 
been justified primarily by appeals to the state’s right to self-determination, grounded 
on more basic rights such as freedom of association (Wellman, 2008), collective 
ownership of public institutions (Pevnick, 2011) or socio-political autonomy (Miller, 
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2005). The core claim of this position is that some basic interest of the citizenry 
generally trumps the interest that prospective immigrants have in a enjoying a greater 
degree of autonomy in their personal lives.  
 In this chapter, I approach the ethics of immigration from a different angle. I 
start with the assumption that liberal states have a right to control their borders (I take 
no stance on whether illiberal states also have this right) but explore what would be 
required of them were they to implement migration arrangements that conform with 
liberal-cosmopolitan principles. In particular, I argue that the obligations states have 
range from feasibility-insensitive (to be referred to as states’ ‘strong’ duties of 
migration) to feasibility-sensitive. Moreover, I show that such duties can have as their 
content both inclusion and exclusion, and can be grounded on the requirements of 
liberal justice, mere capacity to assist as well as past or foreseeable contribution to 
harm. The account therefore aims to realize both theoretical and practical goals. The 
theoretical goal is to offer an account on the ethics of immigration that does not 
advocate for open borders, but is still compatible with liberal-cosmopolitanism. The 
practical goal is to map out a range of migration-related actions that states must 
perform under more and less ideal conditions.  
 The chapter is structured in three sections. In §I, I briefly explain what is 
wrong with the current international trends in migration. In §II, I discuss the strong 
duties states have with regards to their humanitarian, family reunification, and skilled-
migration intake. In §III, I discuss the motivational and institutional constraints that 
currently prevent states from discharging their ‘strong’ migration duties, and propose 
one reasonably feasible strategy that can increase the likelihood that such duties might 




I started this discussion by briefly highlighting the tension between our normative 
ideals and the right of liberal states to exclude. But a less explored tension is that 
between our normative ideals and the specific ways liberal states exercise their right 
to exclude (once it is granted or assumed that they do in fact have such right).i This 
theoretical neglect has had important practical implications: it has kept most of the 
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debate on the ethics of immigration at a very abstract level, with proponents and 
critics of the right to exclude unable to offer existing states much guidance as to how 
to improve their migration arrangements. In what follows, I show that a shift in focus 
from whether there is a right to exclude to how this right should be exercised enables 
us to criticize states for implementation migration arrangements that both harm and 
fail to protect vulnerable persons without appealing to controversial normative and 
empirical claims about the desirability and feasibility of a world of open borders.  
To see how current migration arrangements negatively affect the most 
vulnerable members of the human community, consider that in 2013 it was estimated 
that there were more than 232 million international immigrants, roughly 3,2 per cent 
of the global population (United Nations, 2013). From all the movers, only 16.7 
million were refugees, and even less of them (556,000 or around 3,3 per cent) 
managed to seek asylum in the affluent countries of the OECD, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (IOM, 2014; OECD, 2014). Such low 
numbers of successful migration by refugees is partly a result of liberal states’ 
employment of carrier sanctions, visa requirements and tight border control, justified 
by appeals to the necessity of curbing unauthorized migration, but which have as a 
perverse (and no doubt intentional) effect the creation of significant hurdles for those 
who must migrate in order to seek assistance in the form of asylum (Betts, 2010). At 
the same time, however, liberal states have kept their borders quite open for those 
who possess desirable skills and a capacity for taxpaying. In 2011, the numbers of 
skilled-immigrants arriving in the OECD reached 27 million (UN, 2013b).  
It is therefore no exaggeration to claim that there is an international race on 
the part of liberal states to attract the skilled and repel the needy, which becomes even 
more problematic once we recognize that the departure of skilled individuals from 
developing nations can have quite negative effects in the capacity of vulnerable 
populations to access essential services, such as health care and education—a 
phenomenon known in the literature as brain-drain.  
But apart from not giving priority to those with the strongest need to 
immigrate, liberal states have also departed from liberal-cosmopolitanism by 
developing categories of inclusion that are problematically under-inclusive. First, the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (henceforth: Refugee 
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Convention) privileges the claims of those who suffer political persecution in the 
hands of their governments (or groups supported by their government) over the claims 
of those who are rendered vulnerable as a result of the inaction of their government. 
For instance, mere membership in a failed state does not qualify one for asylum even 
though it is extremely hard to secure one’s fundamental human rights in states 
virtually devoid of the rule of law and other essential public institutions. Second, 
liberal states privilege the claims of spouses and family members, even though 
citizens might have a compelling interest in associating with an intimate they do not 
enjoy a formal relationship with.  
In the next sections, I show that these migration trends do not do justice to the 
basic interests of the most vulnerable to cross international borders and of all citizens 
to associate with those they share a special relationship with. I also show that the way 
states exercise their right to include ignores the urgent interests of citizens in 
developing countries not to be harmed unduly by the negatives effects associated with 
certain kinds of brain drain. This leads me to argue that states must endorse two 
stringent moral responsibilities in the area of immigration: a duty to include and a 
duty to exclude, so that the basic interests currently neglected in migration 




In order to see which migration arrangements are morally desirable, we must first 
idealize the context under which states design and implement their migration 
arrangements. Let us therefore imagine a world where they are sufficiently motivated 
to bring their migration arrangements in line with what morality requires. Let us also 
imagine that they have the right sort of institutional apparatus to implement policies 
and programs that are geared towards the protection and promotion of fundamental 
human rights at the international level. In practice, this means that states will protect 
vulnerable persons from human rights violations by third parties, as well as refrain 




 Now, the point about imagining such a world—and thereby partly engaging in 
so-called ideal theorizing—is not to deny that that there are significant motivational 
and institutional constraints that prevent states from acting rightly within the domain 
of migration. Rather, the aim here is simply to isolate the morally relevant features of 
international migration by assuming away the fact that states are neither typically 
motivated to act on their moral obligations, nor typically capable of mobilizing their 
domestic and international institutions for the successful and widespread protection 
and promotion of fundamental human rights. Indeed, once we put aside feasibility 
concerns about moral action at the international level, we are in a better position to 
focus on the core human interests at stake, and well-placed to answer the following 
question: in a world where states act legitimately when they retain some control over 
their immigration arrangements, which moral claims are sufficiently weight so as to 
impose limits on the right of states to include and exclude? In what follows, I argue 
that there are two classes of persons who impose limits on the right to exclude: 
refugees, broadly conceived, and intimates, broadly conceived. I also argue that the 
claims of vulnerable populations not to be harmed by some forms of brain drain 




According to the Refugee Convention, refugees are persons who are living outside 
their country of citizenship or residence, who have a well-founded fear of suffering 
persecution at the hands of their government (or groups supported by their 
government) because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion (Art. 1A).  The Convention thereby answers the 
conceptual question of who is a refugee by reference to one specific source of 
vulnerability: political persecution. However, given that much human displacement is 
a direct result of state failure, civil conflict, extreme poverty, environmental 
degradation and some of the negative effects associated with climate change, it 
becomes paramount for liberal states to acknowledge that there are different sources 
of vulnerability that push persons outside their country of citizenship (Betts, 2013). 
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Indeed, most scholars writing on the ethics of asylum have defended more 
inclusive definitions of who should count as a refugee. In a very influential 1985 
article, Andrew E. Shacknove, already argued that refugees should be seen as 
“persons whose basic needs are unprotected by their country of origin, who have no 
remaining recourse other than to seek international restitution of their needs, and who 
are so situated that international assistance is possible” (1985: 277). Most recently, 
political theorists have followed suit and have re-defined the refugee as someone who 
cannot secure her most fundamental human rights without migration. David Miller, 
for instance, argues that the “justice claim of a refugee stems from the fact that his 
human rights are currently under threat,” (2015: 395) while Matthew Gibney defines 
the refugee as someone “who requires the substitute protection of a new state because 
their fundamental human rights cannot or will not be protected by their state of 
membership or usual residence” (2015: 452-453).  
 As becomes clear, scholars have focused on the following considerations 
when developing a more inclusive criterion for asylum: i. some persons cannot 
reliably count on their own state of citizenship for the protection or promotion of their 
fundamental human rights, ii. such human right deficits create a stringent duty of 
assistance on capable members of the international community, and iii. at times, states 
can only discharge their duty of assistance by way of inclusion. Taken together, these 
considerations give us a more inclusive definition of asylum as well as the broad 
content of the moral obligation that goes along with it. It also justifies the negotiation 
and ratification of a new Convention, one that does not focus on political persecution, 
but rather on the fact that some persons can only secure their fundamental human 
rights by becoming members of another political community (Ferracioli, 2014). 
  At this juncture two further questions arise with regards to the grounds and 
content of the duty of inclusion that correlates with the right to asylum: what is 
inclusion grounded on, and how long must it last for? 
 Recall that I started the discussion by assuming that states had a right to 
control their borders but that they were also willing and capable of bringing morality 
to bear on the design and implementation of migration arrangements. Moreover, I 
assumed that in such a world, states would be in the business of effectively promoting 
and protecting fundamental human rights abroad. Such idealizing assumptions were 
	7 
	
not meant to convey that the background conditions of the international system would 
be just. On the contrary, I have assumed that the core aspects of international relations 
would remain the same. The only idealization here is that liberal states would de 
disposed and capable of discharging their moral obligations, and so in the business of 
securing fundamental human rights abroad.  
If these assumptions hold, then inclusion will often be grounded on states’ 
capacity to assist at moderate cost to their citizens. However, there would still be 
times when states would play a causal role in refugee flows by, for instance, engaging 
in humanitarian intervention, war or because of past contributing to climate change 
(Souter, 2014). In those instances, inclusion would be grounded on past contribution 
to harm, which would mean that states would be required to bear even higher costs—
that is, include even more people—than if they were simply including refugees as a 
result of their capacity to assist at moderate costs to the citizenry.  
 Finally, let me add that under more ideal conditions, states would always 
include refugees on a permanent basis. This is because permanent inclusion is the 
most reliable way of ensuring that refugees have the resources they need to pursue the 
sorts of projects and relationships that give meaning to their lives. Indeed, when states 
only provide sanctuary until the situation in the refugee’s country of origin has 
improved, she necessarily lacks knowledge of the site of her overall life plans, and so 
is not in an adequate epistemic position to pursue important life plans that require 
long-term planning. Because it is quite difficult to make decisions with regards to 
career, family and education without knowing where one’s life will actually take 
place, there is a strong case for permanent migration under more ideal conditions 
(Ferracioli, 2014).  
 Before we discuss the next class of persons who impose moral limits on the 
right of states to exclude, let me respond to the concern that there are good expressive 
and practical reasons for tying asylum to political persecution since it allows liberal 
states to adequately respond to human rights deficits that arise in poor yet decent 
states—the so-called burdened societies (Rawls, 1999). The concern here is that when 
it comes to discharging their duties of assistance to citizens of burdened societies, 
liberal states can make use of foreign aid rather than asylum, and so can 
simultaneously communicate that burdened societies are able to secure the basic 
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interests of their citizens. As Matthew Price puts it, “citizens of burdened societies 
lack protection of their basic rights, but they retain their standing as members. The 
appropriate stance of outsiders to burdened societies is to lend assistance, not to 
condemn their failings” (2000: 73). Matthew Lister makes a related point by arguing 
that instead of expanding the definition of who counts as a refugee, the international 
community can and should instead adopt a broader reading of the current Refugee 
Convention (2013). 
I certainly agree that liberal states can typically promote and protect the 
human rights of non-members without making use of migration and nothing I said 
above suggests otherwise. But we should not go as far as to assume that expanding 
the definition of refugeehood is not necessary to protect all those in need of 
protection. After all, there are all sorts of human rights violations that are not caused 
by political persecution but that cannot be adequately addressed without migration 
(Betts, 2013; Ferracioli, 2014). Moreover, while I certainly agree with Lister that 
employing a more generous reading of the current Refugee Convention is an 
appropriate response under non-ideal conditions, it still fails to secure the right of 
asylum in a robust way. As it stands, persons whose migration claims are not 
explicitly acknowledged by the Convention are at the mercy of judges and 
bureaucrats in a way that is not true of those who suffer political persecution 
(Ferracioli, 2014). This, however, must change if states are ever to protect all persons 




In the previous section, I have endorsed the position that liberal states have a duty to 
include persons who cannot protect her fundamental human rights without migration, 
if states can do so at moderate costs to their citizen (or at higher costs when states 
have contributed to their predicament). A second group that impose limits on the right 
of liberal states to exclude is what I will refer to as intimates. These are persons who 
are in an intimate relationship with a citizen of a liberal state, such as a parent, child, 
spouse, relative and friend. 
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 To begin with, let me grant that liberal states already acknowledge that there 
are some kinds of relationships that trigger duties of inclusion. Indeed, liberal states 
typically accept that citizens should be able to invite their parents, children and 
spouse to join them as new members of the political community. Moreover, most 
political theorists writing on the ethics of immigration see such programs as 
legitimately grounded on the right to freedom of association of citizens, a 
fundamental cannon of liberal justice (Lister, 2010; Wellman & Cole, 2011; Blake, 
2013). Notwithstanding such theoretical agreements, current family migration 
schemes fall short of giving equal consideration to the interests of all citizens in a 
liberal state since they fail to pick out other human relationships that can be equally 
meaningful and central to people’s lives (Ferracioli, forthcoming).  
 Consider friendships. There is no denying that, like many spouses and family 
members, many close friends care for each other deeply and see each other as 
irreplaceable. There is also no denying that, like spousal and familial relationships, 
friendships are deemed to be objectively valuable by citizens who affirm quite 
different conceptions of the good. So if we think that spouses and family members 
have a right to reside in the same territory due to the value of their relationship to 
themselves and to society at large, then we must think the same of close friends. 
 But if it is true that non-formal special relationships could in principle be as 
valuable for citizens as the relationships currently acknowledged by family migration 
schemes, how do we set them apart from other relationships that do not intuitively 
give rise to claims for inclusion, (like the relationship one might have with a 
neighbour or co-worker)? In other work, I have argued that the following conditions 
are true of valuable tokens of romantic and familial relationships: i. those who partake 
in the relationship find them quite valuable and so have an interest in enjoying 
relationship goods that are territorially located (i.e, living together, setting up a band, 
help each other with care obligations, and so and so forth), ii. those who partake in the 
relationship see the relationship as irreplaceable due to its historic-relational 
properties (that is to say, much of the value of the relationship springs from its shared 
history), iii. the relationship type is deemed valuable by society at large and so the 




If I am right that the conditions above give rise to a migration claim on the 
part of citizens, irrespective of whether or not there is a legal bond that they can 
appeal to (i.e, birth, adoption and marriage certificates), then a surprising result is that 
not all spouses and family members would have a legitimate claim for inclusion. This 
would be true, for instance, of spouses who are still legally married but no longer 
romantically involved, or of estranged sibling. On the other hand, other intimates 
whose relationships are not legally sanctioned by the state could meet all of the 
conditions above, and so would have a strong claim to enjoy relationship goods that 
are territorially located.  
At this stage, a few concerns may arise. For one, it might be thought that 
unlike familial and romantic relationships, other kinds of special relationships can be 
easily pursued or enjoyed without persons actually finding themselves in the same 
territory. Another concern is that states are not in a position of looking “into the hearts 
of citizens” and so must instead pick out relationship types by employing the blunter 
tools of marriage, adoption and birth certificates (Lister, forthcoming). 
In response to the first concern, there is in fact nothing that the liberal states 
can appeal to in order to justify the under-inclusion of family migration schemes 
without violating state neutrality. For appealing to any feature X traditionally 
connected to romantic or familial relationships (i.e., sex, procreative-parenting, 
biological connection, financial dependency, etc.), the liberal states will inevitably 
communicate that certain kinds of romantic and familial relationships are more 
valuable than others. This would grate against the basic requirement that the liberal 
state must remain sufficiently neutral among competing conceptions of the good 
(Ferracioli, forthcoming). 
In response to the second concern, I would grant that the liberal state must, at 
times, make use of more objective criteria that might imperfectly track the morally 
relevant features in a particular case. However, in the case of family migration 
schemes, there are in fact feasible and permissible strategies that would allow 
bureaucrats to assess the existence of a special relationship without recourse to the 
blunter tools of legal certificates. What I have in mind are personal correspondence, 
interviews, testimony, photos, and any other evidence that can be gathered with the 
explicit consent of those making a migration claim. The important point here is that 
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any consented loss of privacy that would arise under more inclusive family migration 
schemes can be justified by the fact that they would be superior to current schemes in 




In the previous sections, we have examined the moral claims that limit the scope of 
the right of liberal states to exclude. In this section, we look at how the harmful 
effects of certain kinds of skill-based migration impose limits on the scope of the right 
to include. The idea here is that there will be persons who should be excluded if 
liberal states are to bring morality to fully bear on their migration arrangements. 
 To begin with, let me grant that much of skill-based migration referred to as 
brain drain is not problematic, all things considered. Often, the negative effects 
associated with the departure of skilled-immigrants are adequately compensated for, 
or outweighed by counter-veiling benefits typically associated with migration (i.e., 
lower unemployment rates, remittances, savings and knowledge transferal). However, 
at times, the departure of skilled-immigrants directly contributes to a state of affairs 
where vulnerable populations in developing countries find themselves unable to enjoy 
the protection and promotion of their fundamental human rights (Brock, 2009). This 
is because some professional skills are not only necessary for the provision of 
essential services such as health care and education, but also non-substitutable for 
other skills and resources and non-shareable across borders (Ferracioli, 2015).  
 In light of the distinction between skilled-based migration that contributes to 
human rights deficits (henceforth: harmful brain drain) and skilled-based migration 
that is either unproblematic or, all things considered, beneficial, we can now see why 
skill-based migration can, at times, impose moral limits on the scope of the right to 
include. After all, there are times where the emigration of high numbers of skilled-
workers contributes to human rights deficits that cannot be adequately compensated 
for or mitigated by the benefits associated with skilled-based migration, no matter 
how great. Such scenario arises when educators, doctors and nurses departure from 
countries where the ratio of worker per population is already below or at the exact 
threshold required for the adequate provision of essential services.ii  
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 So what follows from the fact that skill-based migration can, at times, make it 
harder for vulnerable persons to enjoy access to their fundamental human rights? 
Given that states should not to contribute to (i.e., initiate, sustain or enable) any causal 
chain or process that will foreseeable lead to human deprivation at the international 
level, they should not include immigrants coming from countries where their skills are 
necessary for the provision of essential services.  
More specifically, liberal states must exclude prospective immigrants when 
the following two conditions are met: (i) it is foreseen (or should be foreseen) that 
skill-based migration will bring about or exacerbate harm in the form of human rights 
deficits (when the ratios of professionals to the overall population are such that 
migration will render vulnerable populations less able to access an adequate level of 
essential services) and; (ii) when there are decently paid jobs that are sufficiently 
attractive to prospective skilled-immigrants so that they can adequately employ their 
professional skills if they do not emigrate.iii  
Let me now respond to a couple of objections. First, it could be argued that 
liberal states lack legitimacy to impose justice abroad and so should not expect 
skilled-immigrants to address human rights deficits in their countries of origin when 
liberal states themselves lack a sound record of acting effectively to secure the human 
rights of vulnerable populations. Second, it could be argued that liberal states lack the 
necessary knowledge to avoid enabling harmful brain drain and so cannot have a duty 
to exclude prospective immigrants when the above conditions are met.  Let me take 
each in turn. 
 In an influential discussion of immigration restriction on brain drain grounds, 
Kieran Oberman has argued that whether or not affluent states have the right to 
exclude prospective skilled-immigrants in order to protect vulnerable populations 
depends on whether they have the legitimacy to impose justice abroad. As he puts it, 
“when rich states fail to fulfill their own duties towards the global poor, but 
nevertheless enforce the duties of skilled workers, they exhibit toward the skilled 
workers a form of disrespect: they are forcing others to act in a way that they are not 
prepared to act themselves” (2013: 449).  
However, if my view is correct, Oberman’s way of stating the responsibility of 
recipient states misrepresents the morally salient features of the case. As I see it, 
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liberal states should exclude prospective immigrants on brain drain grounds not 
because they are trying to impose justice abroad, but because they have a moral 
responsibility not to contribute to a causal chain that foreseeably contributes to human 
rights deficits among vulnerable populations in the developing world (Barry & 
Øverland 2012). Oberman’s legitimacy condition leads to the implausible result that 
states must assist vulnerable populations before they are morally entitled to refrain 
from harming them. (I take it that it would be equally implausible to claim that 
individuals must donate to charity before they are morally entitled to buy fair trade 
products). 
 As for the question of knowledge, there is sufficient evidence available for 
liberal states with regard to the consequences of conferring the benefit of immigration 
to skilled-workers on a large-scale when they bring with them skills that are urgently 
needed and could be effectively utilized in their countries of origin. It is therefore 
hard to deny that states know or at least should know that by ignoring inadequate 
ratios of worker per population in the developing world, they enable and therefore 




In the previous section, I have argued that liberal states have strong duties of inclusion 
and exclusion. However, I have also granted that states are motivated primarily by 
prudential reasons when it comes to the design and implementation of their migration 
arrangements.   
 But why is it that states lack the motivation to ensure that their migration 
arrangements comply with the demands of liberal-cosmopolitanism? One plausible 
source of motivation is the state’s commitment to the emerging international human 
rights regime. Here states differ on their level of commitment, but there are good 
reasons for thinking that human rights practice is becoming stronger and to remain 
optimistic that human rights discourse will be even more likely to motivate moral 
action by states in the future (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999). Another source of 
motivation within a certain domain is the existence and strength of the international 
institutional framework under which states operate (Finnemore, 1996).  
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In light of the fact that international arrangements can positively affect the 
level of motivation on the part of states when it comes to discharging their prior moral 
obligations, I believe that states a have a stringent duty to create a new UN agency for 
migration so that they are more likely to discharge their strong duties of migration in 
the future. Indeed, a new, well-funded migration agency would play important 
expressive and practical roles.  
With regards to its expressive role, such an agency would communicate to the 
international community that although states have a right to exclude, the exercise of 
that right is constrained by a number of stringent moral obligations (in the same way 
that the World Health Organization (WHO) enables the international community to 
communicate that although member-states are free to implement their own health care 
programs, some heath concerns are global in scope and demand joint international 
action).  
As for its practical role, this new agency could facilitate compliance with the 
duty to exclude by giving states clear guidance about the citizenship and skills of 
workers who should not be included until there is an adequate ratio of worker per 
population in their country of origin. Most importantly, this agency could encourage 
states to align their response to refugees with the broader human rights regime, by 
urging states to adopt a human–rights based interpretation of the current convention 
(at least, until there is sufficient political support for the ratification of a more 
inclusive one). And of course, such an agency would be well equipped to facilitate 
burden-sharing of refugees by states, as well as create the condition for a refugee 
trading scheme if states could show that such a scheme is both morally permissible 
and likely to be effective in significantly increasing the numbers of persons in receipt 
of protection.     
 I now want to conclude this section by showing that the creation of this 
agency is not only desirable, but also reasonably feasible. This is because there are 
already two international organisations that partly foster international cooperation in 
the domain of migration: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). While these 
agencies already enable some degree of international cooperation in migration, there 
are shortcomings in relying on them as they currently function. 
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 The problem with the UNHCR is its scope. Its mandate has always been 
temporary (although recurring refugee flows have meant that the agency’s mandate 
continues to be extended), and its focus is not on migration per se but on refugees as 
determined by the Refugee Convention. The problem with the IOM relates to its legal 
status, rather than the scope of its work. This intergovernmental organisation (which 
is not part of the United Nations system) is involved in a wide range of issues related 
to the global management of migration, but it lacks a legal mandate to enable proper 
collective action by states. This means that the agency’s focus is limited to service 
provision, research and policy advice.  
 Given that we already have two well-structured, truly international agencies 
that either possesses some of the expertise needed for cooperation or the legitimacy to 
protect the vulnerable, the international community should merge the two 
organisations into a proper, well-funded UN agency. This agency could be labelled 
United Nations Organization for Migration (UNOM), entrusted with the appropriate 
legal mandate and institutional apparatus to ensure that the right of liberal states to 
pursue their own migration arrangements is properly constrained by their moral duties 






i Pevnivk, 2011: Carens, 2013 are exceptions.  
ii For instance, the emigration of two thirds of South-African physicians has exacerbated the 
South-African HIV and the tuberculosis epidemics. See Chopra, et al., 2009. See also El-
Khawas, 2004. 
iii Similar conditions are defended in Ferracioli, 2015. Let me grant that there may be genuine 
uncertainty in some domestic contexts, and that it will be appropriate for states to continue 
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